One way banks have of attracting money is by offering above market rates on CDs and savings accounts. With 6 month treasuries yielding 3.2%, guaranteed rates of 5.0% will attract capital.
Such rates ought not be be government guaranteed but they are. Money will always flock to the highest guaranteed returns.
Competition For Deposits Is Intense
The Wall Street Journal Is talking about Banks’ Narrowing Margins.
Many banks that are gearing up to report fourth-quarter results in the next couple of weeks are likely to report narrowing in net interest margins — a key measure of industry profitability — already at the lowest level since 1991.
Much of the pinch is being attributed to a scramble for deposits. Even though the Federal Reserve has been cutting interest rates, many banks are still offering attractive rates for deposits. A quarterly survey released last week by Citigroup Inc. found that “the competition to raise new deposits” via certificates of deposit and money-market funds “remains intense.”
The survey noted that while some banks have followed the Fed’s lead and trimmed rates, others have been offering promotions that are well above the federal-funds target rate of 4.25%.
That is particularly the case for financial institutions that have run into difficulties and need those deposits to fund loans and build up their capital levels. Countrywide Financial Corp. and E*Trade Financial Corp. — both of which have been hit hard by the credit crunch — are offering some of the industry’s highest rates on products like CDs: one-year rates are about 5%. That pressures other banks to keep their rates up as well. Although that is good news for consumers who get higher returns on their savings, it is bad news for bank profits.
In a report issued yesterday, Bank of America Corp. estimates that the industry will likely see fourth-quarter net interest margins drop by 0.05 to 0.15 percentage point.
“Anecdotal evidence holds that competition has kept deposit costs high and has yet to abate,” said the report issued by banking analysts John McDonald and Kenneth Usdin. They also noted that as some rates fall, “customers move toward higher-yielding products.”
Here is an ad for 5.1% APY on 6 month CDs and 4.75% on savings accounts by Washington Mutual.
Washington Mutual (WM), Corus Bank (CORS), Bank United (BKUNA), Countrywide Financial (CFC) and others are all attracting capital because of FDIC insurance. Can they make it up by lending it out higher? Perhaps, but only by taking on additional risk. Would those banks attract as much capital without FDIC insurance? Hardly.
It was excessive risk that got WaMu (WM), Citigroup (C), Merrill Lynch (MER), Bear Stearns (BSC), Countrywide (CFC) and others into trouble in the first place.
If this financing scheme fails, the taxpayer will be left holding the bag. Does this ring a bell? It should because that is what happened in the S&L; Crisis.
S&L; Crisis Revisited
Wikipedia has this take on the Savings and Loan Crisis.
The Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980/1990s was the failures of savings and loan association in the United States. Over 1,000 savings and loan institutions failed in “the largest and costliest venture in public misfeasance, malfeasance and larceny of all time.” The ultimate cost of the crisis is estimated to have totaled around USD $160.1 billion, about $124.6 billion of which was directly paid for by the U.S. government.
A taxpayer funded government bailout related to mortgages during the Savings and Loan crisis may have created a moral hazard and acted as encouragement to lenders to make similar higher risk loans during the 2007 subprime mortgage financial crisis.
Imprudent real estate lending
In an effort to take advantage of the real estate boom many S&Ls; lent far more money than was prudent, and to risky ventures which many S&Ls; were not qualified to assess. L. William Seidman, former chairman of both the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation, stated: “The banking problems of the 80s and 90s came primarily, but not exclusively, from unsound real estate lending.”
In the 1970s, many banks, but particularly S&Ls;, were experiencing a significant outflow of low-rate deposits, as interest rates were driven up by the high inflation rate of the late 1970s and as depositors moved their money to the new high-interest money-market funds.
Under financial institution regulation which had its roots in the Depression era, federally chartered S&Ls; were only allowed to make a narrowly limited range of loan types. Late in the administration of President Jimmy Carter caps were lifted on rates and the amounts insured per account to $100,000. In addition to raising the amounts covered by insurance the amount of the accounts that would be repaid was increased from 70% to 100%. Increasing FDIC coverage also permitted managers to take more risk to try to work their way out of insolvency so that the government would not have to take over an institution.
The chartering of federally-regulated S&Ls; accelerated rapidly with the Garn – St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which was designed to make S&Ls; more competitive and more solvent. S&Ls; could now pay higher market rates for deposits, borrow money from the Federal Reserve, make commercial loans, and issue credit cards. They were also allowed to take an ownership position in the real estate and other projects to which they made loans and they began to rely on brokered funds to a considerable extent. This was a departure from their original mission of providing savings and mortgages.
Keeping insolvent S&Ls; open
Whereas insolvent banks in the United States were typically detected and shut down quickly by bank regulators, Congress sought to change regulatory rules so S&Ls; would not have some acknowledge insolvency and the FHLB would not have to close them down.
Public Policy Causes of the S&L; Crisis
While Wikipedia has many of the facts correct, pointing the blame at deregulation is missing the boat. Bert Ely gets it right in Public Policy Causes of the S&L; Crisis. Ely lists 15 reasons but the first one really says it all.
Federal deposit insurance, which was extended to S&Ls; in 1934, was the root cause of the S&L; crisis because deposit insurance was actuarially unsound from its inception. That is, deposit insurance provided by the federal government tolerated the unsound financial structure of S&Ls; for years. No sound insurance program would have done that. Federal deposit insurance is unsound primarily because it charges every S&L; the same flat-rate premium for every dollar of deposits, thus ignoring the riskiness of individual S&Ls.; In effect, the drunk drivers of the S&L; world pay no more for their deposit insurance than do their sober siblings.
Borrowing short to lend long was the financial structure that federal policy effectively forced S&Ls; to follow after the Great Depression. S&Ls; used short-term passbook savings to fund long-term, fixed-rate home mortgages. Although the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage may have been an admirable public policy objective, the federal government picked the wrong horse, the S&L; industry, to do this type of lending since S&Ls; always have funded themselves primarily with short-term deposits. The dangers inherent in this “maturity mismatching” became evident every time short-term interest rates rose.
This time it was banks taking riskier and riskier lending positions. The underlying belief was that property values always go up so there was no risk. That belief was blown out of the water.
WaMu is heavily into Pay Option ARMs. An accounting absurdity let WaMu (and others) record negative amortization from those ARMs as earnings. The investment community cheered what should have been an enormous red flag. The Pay Option ARM problem went ignored for months as the following chart shows.
Washington Mutual Weekly Chart
The chart shows that Pay Option ARM problems finally caught up with Washington Mutual in July of 2007. In spectacular fashion there was an Asymmetrical Unwind of the Credit Bubble at WaMu and many other financial companies.
Now Washington Mutual is attempting to shore up its balance sheet by attracting capital at above market rates.
Watch Corus Bankshares
Corus Bank is another one to watch. Check out Corus Bank’s business model as listed on Yahoo Finance.
Corus Bankshares, Inc. operates as the holding company for Corus Bank, N.A. that offers consumer and corporate banking products and services. The bank’s deposit products include checking, savings, money market, and time deposit accounts. Its loan portfolio primarily comprises commercial real estate loans, including condominium construction and condominium conversion loans; commercial loans; and residential real estate loans.
The bank focuses its lending activities in various metropolitan areas in Florida and California, as well as in Las Vegas, New York City, and the Washington, D.C.
Corus Bank focuses it lending in many of the major collapsing real estate bubbles in the country. Were it not for FDIC insurance would anyone want to take a risk on Corus Bank’s CDs?
Woes at Bank United
BankUnited, whose $15 billion in assets makes it the largest bank based in Florida, reported large increases in provisions for possible loan losses on its monthly option adjustable-rate mortgages in 2007. The bank’s non-current ratio has been rising for those loans, which permit borrowers to defer some monthly interest payments and thus increase their loan balances.
Check out this ad I found tonight.
Now I have my own moral hazard to consider. By pointing out this ad, will money flow into Countrywide CDs that would not have otherwise?
Who’s Who Of Companies With Problems
Click On Chart For A Sharper Image
If you want to see a Who’s Who of companies with problems just take a look at High Yield CD Rates. They all will mention FDIC insurance. Without it, who would invest with these companies?
FDIC is a moral hazard that caused the S&L; crisis.
Perhaps we are in for a repeat performance.
Mike “Mish” Shedlock
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